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You Can't Become Rich In Your Pocket Until You Become Rich In Your Mind | ||||
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But do we really have a democracyDEMOCRACY DO WE (SHOULD WE) HAVE A DEMOCRACY? Do We ? Libertarians find fault with interventionist government. Contrary to their views, interventionism is not the problem. Our real problem lies deeper, in the very nature of our government. Its consistent failure to be responsive to the needs of citizens, but to be solicitous, instead, of special interest groups, is symptomatic of a structural flaw. Politics has been reduced to an arena in which rich and powerful interests vie for greater riches and power. This is due to a loss of individual influence in the political process, a loss that stems from size. The public feels no sense of participation in or responsibility for legislative decisions. This encourages governments to adopt short-term palliatives rather than deep-seated solutions that might cause temporary pain. For the public will turn on politicians only if it is suffering. Special interests, called “factions” by our founding fathers, breed in the widening gap between representative and voter. Elected officials cater to these special interests and disregard their constituents with impunity, for if people are economically sated, they care little about the political arena and will passively re-elect incumbents running smooth well-funded campaigns. This problem must be faced by any large democracy, and it calls into question the viability of this form of government for large heterogeneous countries. The prototypes of successful democracies, classical Athens, Germanic tribes in the days of the Roman Empire, the early U.S., and even the short-lived eighteenth century democracies in Corsica and Haiti, had small, homogeneous, self-sufficient populations. Citizens could identify with each other. It was easier to preserve a sense of community and an interest in the common good. Early nineteenth century New England town meetings, paragons of democracy, were held in small communities in which citizens had similar backgrounds, outlooks and interests. Broad political participation was common. The lack of socio-economic status did not discourage anyone from having political opinions and expressing them. “American mechanics, it was said, ‘are not untaught operatives, but an enlightened, reflective people, who not only know how to use their hands, but are familiar with principles.’” (Lasch, The Revolt of the Elites and the Betrayal of Democracy, p. 60.) But as our society has grown larger and more heterogeneous, it has become more difficult to conduct meaningful dialogue, to obtain informed consensus on issues, and to deal with the conflicting interests. People have become less inclined to transcend their private interests in favor of needs of the community. Attitudes have increasingly diverged from those regarded by the classical Athenians as integral and necessary to democracy. This calls attention to one of Tocqueville’s chief concerns: Can participatory democracy be viable on a large scale? That remains a critical question today, more than 150 years later. Of course, the politically correct answer is that the U.S. is even now a perfect example of a viable democracy. But do we really have a democracy? In the wake of the growth of megacorporations, which have replaced small proprietorships and farms over the last century and a half, participatory democracy has declined. Our practice of democracy, broad-based public participation in the political process, has been subtly transformed. While we have retained the forms of democracy, we have auctioned off its substance and its spirit. We are not unique in this. “Romans liked to congratulate themselves for following what they called mos maiorum — ‘the ways of our ancestors’. They were fond of old traditions and liked to keep alive old ways of doing things… Even when doing something new, the Romans liked to wrap it up in antique packaging. The names and forms of many republican institutions — and the delusion that the state was a republic and not a monarchy — endured long after they ceased to be appropriate.” (Roberts, A History of Europe, p. 50.) Democracy A millennium later, in a different culture: “When a ruler assumed the throne, there was a ceremony of investiture (bay’a), a vestige of the early Islamic convention that the ruler was chosen by the people.” (Hourani, A History of the Arab Peoples, p.136.) Public faith in the sanctity of our own mos maiorum has led us to close our eyes to developments that subvert the spirit of democracy, for we are uncomfortable with the politically incorrect. Yet inexorable forces have gradually pushed us in this direction. Nearly 200 years ago Nicholas Biddle, a staunch adversary of Andrew Jackson, counseled William Henry Harrison’s campaign: “Let him say not one single word about his principles, or his creed — let him say nothing — promise nothing. Let no committee, no convention — no town meeting ever extract from him a single word about what he thinks now, or what he will do hereafter...” (Muller, Freedom in the Modern World, p. 87.) Biddle’s advice was ahead of its time. As our country has grown and prospered, the increased sophistication of marketing, the tools and techniques available to well-funded campaigns, and the size of political spoils have changed the very nature of the political process. Stakes have grown too high to leave politics to chance. Market research, product selection and advertising now drive the process. Not only the tools of advertising and marketing, but also the vehicles, the mass media, have come to play a dominant role. Politics has become an industry driven by free market principles and in free market vehicles. The cost of these vehicles has imposed a new structure on politics. Politicians at all levels understand it is the best packaging and most effective marketing that win elections. Marketing the candidate, reaching people with a short simple message that provides name recognition and a warm feeling, requires expensive media ads and drives up the cost of running for office. The high cost of campaigns, which must be borne by the candidate and his supporters, reduces the electoral process to an auction and perverts the spirit of democracy. In the spirit of this perversion, special interest groups are delighted to serve as underwriters. They contribute to candidates and parties in return for influence on legislation. These groups spend billions of dollars in the political arena to increase their income by tens of billions through tax benefits, trade legislation, or the structure of government programs. They profit handsomely from the privatization of government. Little pretense is made that the aim is to benefit the American people. If it were, special interests would not have to spend billions of dollars on lobbying. We would not need 100,000 registered lobbyists. Nor does anyone pretend campaign contributions are an expression of political ideology or confidence in a candidate — for large organizations contribute heavily to both political parties at the same time, and to anyone likely to win. These contributions are investments, money spent to exact favors from whoever wins. They are good investments. If they were not, if they failed to generate significant incremental contributions to bottom lines (at our expense, for they create no new wealth), organizations would have stopped making such contributions long ago. It is only natural that these investors, the campaign donors who are responsible for who gets elected, ultimately wield the power. “Decision making in the city [Washington D.C.] has increasingly come to be a polling of affected campaign donors and interest groups, rather than of the people…” (Kevin Philips, Arrogant Capital, p. 36.) These donors use their economic power to purchase political influence to protect and increase their economic power. Philip Morris is one of the largest investors in the lobbying industry. Its contributions have been directed to maximizing political leverage to advance its economic interests. The Economist (August 31 — September 6, 1996) reports that in California it contributed $125,000 to a Republican candidate who barely won against an anti-tobacco candidate and became the majority whip. This contribution and others, to the Democratic ex-speaker of the house and the Republican attorney general, insured California’s refusal to join other states in suing the tobacco companies. Some states could be bought more cheaply. Gov. Bill Owens appoints a tobacco lobbyist to head a Colorado health care agency. She helps him craft a plan to aid uninsured breast and cervical cancer patients. The governor puts the plan on this week’s special session agenda — but says lawmakers must pay for cancer treatments solely from programs designed to reduce tobacco use. Some public health advocates say that adds up to a deliberate raid on programs proven to save lives. “It’s difficult to conclude anything but he’s going after tobacco prevention,” said Bob Doyle of the American Lung Association.… State election records show Owens received a $5,000 campaign contribution from cigarette maker Philip Morris three weeks before announcing his plan. They also show that Karen Reinertson, a state official who helped developed the plan, lobbied for tobacco interests for seven years before Owens appointed her to head his Department of Health Care Policy and Financing. (The Denver Post, September 19, 2001, p. B1.) This is only the tip of the iceberg. Spending at the state level is small potatoes. Given the enormous spoils at the national level, huge amounts have been invested to sway public opinion and lawmakers’ votes. “In 1993-1994, during the height of a national debate over health care reform, interest spending on outside lobbying alone totaled an estimated $790 million.” (Schier, By Invitation Only: The Rise of Exclusive Politics in the United States, p. 171.) In a similar vein, “The telecommunications fight pitted competing economic interests…as they fought over the spoils. The interest that was hardly heard in the struggle was the public’s.” (Drew, The Corruption of American Politics, p. 80.) In some cases the quid pro quo is blatant. “When Amway founder Richard M. DeVos and his wife Helen each gave $500,000 to the GOP in April 1997, the payback came from the two most powerful people in Congress. In July, Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott and House Speaker Newt Gingrich slipped a lastminute provision into the hotly contested compromise tax bill that granted the DeVos family’s company, Amway, a tax break on the Asian branches, saving it $19 million…. ‘I know a little something about soft money, as my family is the largest single contributor of soft money to the national Republican Party,’ Betsy DeVos wrote in an op-ed for the Capitol Hill newspaper Roll Call. ‘I have decided, however, to stop taking offense at the suggestion that we are buying influence. Now I simply concede the point. They are right. We do expect some things in return.’” (Mother Jones, November-December 1998, p. 56.) This sort of investment may skirt the legal definition of “bribery.” But it fully captures the essence of the term. It explains why people resort to bribery, and why we have made it a crime. Isn’t it ironic that bribery is a felony while pseudo-bribery in the context of political campaigns is the effective basis of our political power? Is this compatible with democracy? And people wonder why we have lost confidence in the system! Even initiatives, long hoped by reformers to restore a measure of direct democracy, have become a tool of narrow moneyed interests. It requires capital to hire consultants to couch the initiative in the most appealing terms. It costs up to $5 per signature to get the initiative onto the ballot. It is expensive to air the necessary advertising. “The single most important finding in this study concerns the crucial role of money in campaigns on ballot questions… Time after time I have noted the initially favorable attitudes of voters shift to negativism, in large part as a result of advertising that is at best simplistic…and at its worst deceptive.” (Zisk, Money Media and the Grass Roots: State Ballot Issues and the Electoral Process, p. 245, 264.) The practice of investing in the political process to maximize influence, in addition to forging an alliance among capital, issues and candidates, has changed our notion of the ideal campaign and the ideal candidate. In campaigns it has replaced the focus on broad themes geared to the general electorate with niche marketing, for this is the most efficient use of capital. In recent decades, parties, interests, and campaigns have discovered what has become the most efficient way to succeed in elections and policy making.… The cost and risk of reaching out to all citizens is increasingly irrational for these elites. Providing exclusive invitations is the rational way to political success.… It is now possible for candidates, parties, and interests to rule without serious regard to majority preferences.… These strategies don’t aim at the improvement of the commons as a primary goal…but instead serve to further narrow group or campaign goals. (Schier, By Invitation Only, p. 1-22.) Candidates have been similarly transformed. It is less their understanding of the issues, their commitment to a well-conceived platform, or even their character and record in public service. It is more their ability to play the role designed by the professional political team. Perversely, this has made the selection procedure for the best candidates incompatible with a selection procedure for the best elected officials. “The new technology has fundamentally altered the way in which the modern political candidate perceives his role. The great statesmen of the past saw themselves as heroes who took on the burden of their societies’ painful journey from the familiar to the as yet unknown. The modern politician is less interested in being a hero than a superstar. Heroes walk alone; stars derive their status from approbation. Heroes are defined by inner values, stars by consensus. When a candidate’s views are forged in focus groups and ratified by television anchorpersons, insecurity and superficiality become congenital…. Glibness rather than profundity, adeptness rather than analytical skill constitute their dominant traits.” (Kissinger, Years of Renewal, p. 29, 1066.) |
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